Postęp bez deficytu
Wczorajsze serwisy zdominowały o wiele ważniejsze sprawy, chociażby prezydent Putin, który przysnął podczas pochodu reprezentacji Ukrainy na otwarciu Igrzysk w Pekinie, ale warto przypomnieć, że 4 lutego 1970 roku założono Prypeć. Osiedle dla pracowników Czarnobylskiej Elektrowni Jądrowej znajdowało się w odległości czterech kilometrów od samej instalacji nuklearnej. Zamarło po szesnastu latach. Miasto jest ilustracją wielkiej nieostrożności inżynierów podczas testów reaktora i jeszcze większej nieodpowiedzialności oraz opieszałości ze strony rządu podczas ewakuacji i akcji ratunkowej. Morał na dziś: nie znasz się – nie majstruj, bo sprowadzisz na siebie i potomnych katastrofę…
Pozyskiwanie energii, pomimo kontrowersji, w wielu krajach jest oparte na sieci elektrowni jądrowych. Warto zadać sobie pytanie jak wygląda polski mix energetyczny na tle innych państw. Można posłużyć się przykładem Ukrainy i Francji. Z danych Międzynarodowej Agencji Energetycznej i Banku Światowego wyłania się osobliwy obraz rynku energetycznego.
Polska
Polska jest eksporterem energetycznym netto, głównie do Republiki Czeskiej i Słowacji, ale w ostatnich latach odnotowała zmniejszony poziom eksportu, ponieważ popyt krajowy nadal rośnie. Polska ma największe rezerwy węgla w Europie (ponad 17,5 mld ton) i jest drugim co do wielkości producentem węgla w Europie, tuż za Niemcami.
W 2016 r. 48% pierwotnego zużycia energii w kraju opierało się na węglu, a wszystkie paliwa kopalne razem stanowiły 95%. Polska produkuje skromne ilości ropy i gazu ziemnego, ale jest znaczącym importerem netto obu paliw, głównie z Rosji. W dokumentach polityki energetycznej kraju z 2009 roku przewidziano 54% wzrost popytu na energię elektryczną w latach 2006-2030.
Od 2006 roku do 2016 roku popyt wzrósł aż o 20%. Pomimo obfitych zasobów krajowych węgla, Unia Europejska wyznacza ścisłe cele polityki klimatycznej, co oznacza, że kraj powinien dywersyfikować rynek energetyczny. Pomimo, że bezpieczeństwo energetyczne opiera się na dostawach z Rosji, polityka klimatyczna ma wyższy priorytet.
Warto zaznajomić się z pełną treścią dokumentu Polityka energetyczna Polski – raport World Nuclear Association. W dalszej części raportu dotyczącego sektora polskiej energetyki czytamy (w oryginale):
„A January 2014 report by the Ministry of Economy compared electricity costs in 2025, and nuclear power was least-cost at 80% capacity factor and above (€86/MWh, dropping to €71/MWh at full capacity, 2013 €).
In 2009 shale gas exploration and the nuclear programme were the immediate priorities, expected then to cost Zloty 56 billion (€13 billion) and Zloty 80 billion (€19 billion) respectively by about 2025. However, ExxonMobil and Chevron then pulled out of exploration of shale gas in Poland. In 2011 the International Energy Agency showed Poland’s shale gas resources as the largest in Europe, at over 5000 billion cubic metres and the government quoted reserves of over 750 billion m3 as it prepared to release new regulations to encourage exploration and extraction of those. More recent estimates have slashed the shale gas resource estimates to one-tenth of earlier figures. USGS in 2012 estimated 38 billion m3 recoverable. State gas utility PGNiG is responsible for shale gas development.
In February 2012 the state-owned Polska Grupa Energetyczna SA (PGE) adopted a plan to invest over 330 billion zloty ($103 billion) between 2012 and 2035. This would raise its generating capacity from 13.1 GWe, to 21.3 GWe by 2035. As of 2017, PGE had 16.3 GWe installed capacity. Currently, PGE generates about two-thirds of its power from lignite, with most of the rest coming from hard coal. The 2012 PGE plan outlined the company’s aims to generate about 36% of its electricity using 6 GWe of nuclear capacity, with 11% coming from gas, 14% from renewables, 33% from lignite and 5% from coal. PGE supplies about 40% of Poland’s electricity now, and expects to increase this partly by buying generation assets of EDF and Engie, as part of the country re-nationalising its power sector. PGE completed the purchase of eight mostly coal-powered plants in large Polish cities from EDF for €1 billion in November 2017. Vattenfall’s assets have already been bought by state utilities Tauron and PGNiG. Enea bought Engie’s Polaniec coal-fired plant in March 2017.
In 2015 the government was considering merging its four largest electric utilities into two, to improve competitiveness in the EU market. Plans involved PGE, Tauron Polska Energia, Energa and Enea.
Wind energy has been contentious. In 2016, 13 TWh was generated from 5.8 GWe according to government sources, and in June 2016 parliament passed a bill which would virtually eliminate further onshore windfarms.
Poland’s revised energy policy to 2040 (PEP2040) was adopted in February 2021. It calls for Poland to obtain 23% of its energy from renewable sources by 2030, compared with 13% at present. It plans a big reduction in coal use and an increase in wind energy, especially from farms in the Baltic Sea, and the commissioning of Poland’s first nuclear power reactor in 2033, followed by subsequent units, with investment of PLN 140 billion (about $40 billion). PGE welcomed the strategy”.
Ukraina
Duża część dostaw energii pierwotnej na Ukrainie pochodzi z uranu i znacznych zasobów węgla. Pozostała część, czyli ropa i gaz, jest importowana z Rosji, ale w coraz większym stopniu także z Unii Europejskiej.
W 1991 roku, w wyniku podziału Związku Radzieckiego, gospodarka kraju upadła, a wytwarzanie energii elektrycznej dramatycznie spadło z 296 TWh w 1990 roku do 170 TWh w 2000 roku. W grudniu 2005 r. Ukraina i UE podpisała umowę o współpracy energetycznej, która sprawiła, że Ukraina włączyła się w struktury atomowej sieci energetycznej Europy Zachodniej. Ukraina posiada 15 bloków energii jądrowej, o szczegółach można przeczytać w poniższym raporcie Polityka energetyczna Ukrainy – raport World Energy Association
W dalszej części raportu dotyczącego sektora ukraińskiej energetyki czytamy (w oryginale):
„Ukraine has investigated developing its significant shale gas deposits, with an aim of self-sufficiency in natural gas by 2020, but 2019 production of about 21 bcm suggests it will fall short of this target.
In mid-2012 the Ukraine energy strategy to 2030 was updated, and 5000-7000 MWe of new nuclear capacity was proposed by 2030, costing some $25 billion. A major increase in electricity demand to 307 TWh per year by 2020 and 420 TWh by 2030 was envisaged, and government policy was to continue supplying half of this from nuclear power. This would have required 29.5 GWe of nuclear capacity in 2030, up from 13.8 GWe (13.1 GWe net) through to 2021. The new government formed in 2014 confirmed these targets, and said that Ukraine aimed to integrate with the European power grid and gas network to make the country part of the European energy market by 2017. A further update of energy strategy in August 2017 put the nuclear share of electricity at about 50% to 2035, with hydro 13% and other renewables 25%.
In February 2021 the government confirmed the need for three more nuclear power reactors, notably completing Khmelnitsky 3&4 and building Rovno 5 to replace the two older units there, as well as implementing the 'energy bridge’ project to Poland and Hungary.
A lot of Ukraine’s coal is in the Donbass region adjacent to Russia where following military action in 2013, the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts in the eastern extremity of Ukraine have declared themselves as independent republics with close affiliation and support from Russia.
Ukraine-EU ‘energy bridge’ (Energomost)
In March 2015 an agreement was signed by Ukraine’s Ukrenergo distribution company and Polenergia, a Polish counterpart, to export electricity as part of the Ukraine-European Union ‘energy bridge’, and related to the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan. This would enable greater use of Ukraine’s nuclear capacity and is to generate funds to pay for increasing that capacity at Khmelnitski by completing units 3&4. The plan is for a 750 kV, 2000 MW transmission connection from Khmelnistki 2 to Rzeszow in Poland, taking in also Ukraine’s Burshtyn coal-fired plant in the far west of the country, with Khmelnistki 2 then being disconnected from the Ukraine grid and synchronized with the EU grid, as Burshtyn already is*. Albertirsa in Hungary is also to be linked. In June 2015 the government approved the project, but it has not yet proceeded.
* The 2300 MWe Burshtyn power station was disconnected from the national grid in 2002 to form the Burshtyn Energy Island, synchronized with the EU grid – ENTSO-E – and with a 400 kV connection to Hungary, Slovakia and Romania and a HVDC link proposed. Replacement of one-third of its old capacity with a new supercritical unit is proposed. However, Burshtyn partly relies on coal from eastern Ukraine mines now controlled by pro-Russian rebels. In 2017, 550 MWe effective capacity was reported.
The project consortium comprises Polenergia, EdF Trading and Westinghouse, which had already assisted in its feasibility study. The estimated project cost is $2.6 billion.
In August 2016 Energoatom signed an agreement with Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), one objective of which is to cooperate in the Ukraine-EU energy bridge project, as well as completing Khmelnitski 3&4. In September 2020 KHNP was proposing to build an APR1400 reactor at Rovno”.
Francja
W ciągu ostatniej dekady Francja eksportowała każdego roku blisko 70 TWH energii. W pierwszej połowie z 2021 r. Francja była największym eksporterem energii elektrycznej w Europie, głównie do Wielkiej Brytanii i Włoch.
Obecny mix energetyczny Francji wynika ze strategii rządu francuskiego i działań podejmowanych w 1974 roku. Tuż po „kryzysie naftowym” szybko zwiększono zdolność do wytwarzania energii jądrowej, przy użyciu technologii Westinghouse. Niniejsza decyzja została podjęta w kontekście Francji, jako kraju o znacznej wiedzy inżynierskiej, ale nie posiadającego znacznych zasobów energetycznych.
Energia jądrowa miała zminimalizować import i pozwolić osiągnąć większe bezpieczeństwo energetyczne. W wyniku decyzji z 1974 roku Francja posiada wysoki poziom niezależności energetycznej, a także niezwykle niski poziom emisji dwutlenku węgla na mieszkańca z wytwarzania energii elektrycznej. Ponad 80% francuskiej energii elektrycznej pochodzi z elektrowni jądrowych lub wodnych. Co warte podkreślenia w pierwszej połowie 2021 roku konsumenci gospodarstw domowych we Francji płacili około 90% średniej ceny energii elektrycznej w Unii Europejskiej.
Warto zaznajomić się z pełną treścią dokumentu Polityka energetyczna Francji – raport World Nuclear Association. W opracowaniu, dotyczącym polityki energetycznej kraju, czytamy (w oryginale):
„In 1999 a parliamentary debate reaffirmed three main planks of French energy policy: security of supply, respect for the environment (especially re greenhouse gases) and proper attention to radioactive waste management. It was noted that natural gas had no economic advantage over nuclear for base-load power, and its prices were very volatile. It was accepted that there was no way renewables and energy conservation measures could replace nuclear energy in the foreseeable future.
Early in 2003 France’s first national energy debate was announced, in response to a „strong demand from the French people”, 70% of whom had identified themselves as being poorly informed on energy questions. A poll had shown that 67% of people thought that environmental protection was the single most important energy policy goal. (However, 58% thought that nuclear power caused climate change while only 46% thought that coal burning did so). The debate was to prepare the way for defining the energy mix for the next 30 years in the context of sustainable development at a European and at a global level.
In 2005 a law established guidelines for energy policy and security. The role of nuclear power was central to this, along with specific decisions concerning the European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR), notably to build an initial unit so as to be able to decide by 2015 on building a series of about 40 of them. It also set out research policy for developing innovative energy technologies consistent with reducing carbon dioxide emissions and it defined the role of renewable energies in the production of electricity, in thermal uses and transport.
Early in 2008 a Presidential decree established a top-level Nuclear Policy Council (Conseil Politique Nucléaire – CPN), underlining the importance of nuclear technologies to France in terms of economic strength, notably power supply. It is chaired by the President and includes the prime minister as well as the cabinet secretaries in charge of energy, foreign affairs, economy, industry, foreign trade, research and finance. The head of the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), the secretary general of national defence and the military chief of staff are on the council. (See section below on Nuclear technology exports for further information.)
Following the election of President Francois Hollande in 2012 with his policy to reduce the proportion of nuclear power in the energy mix, a new wide ‘national debate on energy transition’ was called, which ran eight months to July 2013. The Ministry for Ecology Sustainable Development and Energy counted 170,000 people taking part in 1000 regional debates, and received 1200 submissions over the Internet. A report published in September 2013 by OPECST, a scientific commission of senators and MPs from the upper and lower houses of Parliament said France risked being exposed to a power price shock if it pursued a speedy reduction of nuclear power and there was insufficient replacement through renewable energy and energy efficiency measures.
In October 2014 the Energy Transition for Green Growth bill was passed by the National Assembly and so went onto the Senate. This set a target of 50% for nuclear contribution to electricity supply by 2025, and capped nuclear power capacity at 63.2 GWe, the level at the time. This meant that EDF would have to shut at least 1650 GWe of nuclear capacity when its Flamanville 3 EPR starts commercial operation. The bill also set long-term targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2030 compared with 1990 levels, and by 75% by 2050; to halve final energy consumption by 2050 compared with 2012 levels; to reduce fossil fuel consumption by 30% by 2030 relative to 2012; and to increase the share of renewables in final energy consumption to 32% by 2030. The Senate early in 2015 amended the bill to remove the nuclear cap, but this was not accepted in the lower house. The National Assembly approved the bill including 970 amendments in July 2015, but with the 63.2 GWe nuclear cap and only 50% nuclear supply by 2025. In October 2016 the government postponed until after the 2017 presidential and National Assembly elections any decision on which, if any, reactors would close in order to reduce the nuclear share to 50%. In 2017 France postponed its 2025 target for reducing the share of nuclear to 50%. In December 2017 the French President stated that nuclear is „the most carbon-free way to produce electricity with renewables.” In November 2018, a draft of the country’s new energy plan confirmed that 2035 was the new target date for the reduction of nuclear’s share to 50%. The plan states that 14 of the country’s nuclear reactors will shut down by 2035, 4-6 of those by 2030. However the plan also states that the option to build new nuclear reactors remains.
A government consultation document released in January 2020 named Blayais, Bugey, Chinon, Cruas, Dampierre, Gravelines, and Tricastin as the plants where EDF plans to make closures to meet the government’s target. The document stated that a decision on early shutdows would be made in 2023, and that following Fessenheim in 2020, the next plant closures were expected 2027-2028.
In November 2021 the French President announced that France was preparing to start construction of new reactors. In January 2022 the Minister for the Ecological Transition said that plans for new reactors were to be submitted around 2023 with a target date of 2035-7 for the reactors to be commissioned. The new reactors are to be EPR2 models.
Earlier in March 2016 Areva, EdF and CEA announced the formation of the tripartite French Nuclear Platform (PFN) to improve the joint effectiveness of the three bodies and devise a shared vision of a medium- and long-term goal for the industry, supporting the Nuclear Policy Council (CPN). Its initial agenda will include the review of technological options for the EPR NM reactor design and the coordination of positions on regulatory changes, notably regarding safety requirements and objectives. The PFN will also address the future of reprocessing in France and elsewhere, the CIGEO deep geological repository project, the development of dismantling technologies for decommissioned reactors, and R&D work on fourth-generation reactor designs.
In October 2019 the environment and economy ministers asked EDF to study the potential for building three pairs of EPR2 reactors at three existing nuclear sites in France. They initially planned to make a decision by mid-2021 on a possible programme for building such capacity, in line with its January 2019 energy plan (PPE), but have delayed doing so until after the Flamanville 3 reactor is operational. The possible new reactor programme relates to a submission to the government by SFEN, the French Nuclear Energy Society, urging such a programme and saying that the construction cost of new reactors could be reduced by 30% and their financing cost by 50%”.
To tylko kilka przykładów podejścia do polityki energetycznej na kontynencie europejskim. Wszystkie dane pochodzą ze strony organizacji World Nuclear Association
Analiza kolejnych dokumentów prowadzi do interesujących wniosków. Czy jedyną drogą pozostaje pozyskiwanie energii ze źródeł odnawialnych? Czy zaspokoimy w ten sposób nieustanną potrzebę rozwoju energochłonnych gałęzi gospodarki? Czy energia wystarczy do wytworzenia żywności dla kolejnych miliardów ludzi? Czy źle pojmowany postęp będzie rodzić kolejne deficyty?
Misją organizacji World Nuclear Association, która przygotowuje obszerne raporty, jest promowanie szerszego zrozumienia istoty energii jądrowej. W obliczu rosnącego globalnego deficytu energetycznego, stopniowego zanikania złóż paliw kopalnych, członkowie World Nuclear Association zachęcają do debaty nad przyszłością energetyki atomowej.
Źródło opracowania: World Nuclear Association